Washington Sentencing Court Must Order Restitution in Amount of CVCA Benefits Paid

The Department of Labor and Industries (“L&I”) administers the Crime Victims Compensation Program. Generally, the court must order restitution in Washington criminal cases where the victim is entitled to benefits pursuant to the crime victims’ compensation act (“CVCA”) as set forth in chapter 7.68 RCW.  If the court has not ordered restitution in a case where a victim is entitled to such benefits, L&I may petition for restitution within a year from judgment being entered.  The court must then hold a restitution hearing and enter a restitution order.  RCW 9.94A.75(7).  In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered whether the court had discretion to order restitution to L&I in an amount less than the CVCA benefits paid.

According to the opinion, the defendant pleaded guilty to crimes related to a home invasion that resulted in the death of one of the residents of the home.  The state sought $10,480 in restitution to L&I for benefits paid related to the victim’s medical and funeral expenses.

The defendant asked for a reduction in the amount of restitution based on mitigating factors.  The trial court denied his request, believing its discretion was limited, and ordered restitution in the amount sought by the state.  The appeals court affirmed the restitution order.

The Washington Supreme Court granted review.

The Court noted that RCW 9.94A.753 generally gives the court broad discretion with regard to restitution. It pointed out that RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) expressly permits the court to determine whether the defendant pays full, partial, or no restitution to an insurer or state agency based on the defendant’s current or likely future ability to pay, but specifically excepts restitution owed to L&I pursuant to chapter 7.68 RCW.

The defendant argued that the statute did not state the amount of restitution the court may impose, while the state argued the law requires the court to award restitution in the amount of CVPA benefits. The state argued the legislature would have expressly stated the amount was discretionary if that was its intent.

The Court held that RCW 9.94A.753(7) is not ambiguous. When considering the statute’s plain language in the context with other subsections of the restitution statute and the CVCA, the Court concluded the trial court is required to order restitution in the amount of CVCA benefits paid.

The Court considered the restitution statute within the context of other legal financial obligation (“LFO”) statutes. LFOs are part of a defendant’s sentence pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act.  The Court noted that the law prioritizes restitution over other LFOs. Indigent defendants are not required to pay costs, but are still required to pay restation.  Additionally, victim restitution is paid first from LFO payments received by the court clerk, then other restitution, and costs are paid last.  The court keeps jurisdiction over restitution until the full obligation has been satisfied, while other LFOs may only be enforced within 10 years. RCW 9.94A.760. The Court concluded these differences showed an intent for restitution “to be treated independently from other LFOs.”

RCW 9.94A.753 generally gives the court discretion to determine restitution.  The Court pointed out that subsections (1), (3), and (5) give the court “wide latitude” to determine if restitution is appropriate and the amount ordered.

The defendant argued that the court’s “inherent” discretion should also apply to subsection (7), but the court rejected this argument based on the plain language of the subsection.  This provision does not include the discretionary language in the other subsections.  Subsection (7) specifically applies to restitution reimbursing L&I for CVCA benefits and the language shows a legislative intent to keep courts from changing the amount of restitution from the amount of CVCA benefits.

Nothing in subsection (7) permits a court to use discretion to modify the amount of restitution.  Nor does this subsection allow the court to consider “exceptional circumstances” or the defendant’s financial circumstances.

The Court pointed out that subsection RCW 9.94A.753(3)(b) was added by amendment in 2022.  The legislature amended the statute to allow court’s to reduce restitution to state agencies and insurer’s if the defendant is not able to pay, but did not amend subsection (7). In fact, subsection (3)(b) specifically excludes restitution owed to L&I for CVCA benefits.

The legislature also amended the statute involving interest on restitution to allow the courts to waive or reduce it with no exception for restitution to L&I. The Court determined the difference in these two provisions showed that the legislature would provide discretion expressly when it intended for the court to have discretion involving restitution.

The Court noted the amount of CVCA benefits a victim is entitled to receive is determined based on statute. Benefits are based on qualifying expenses the victim incurred due to the crime, with statutory caps.  The Court concluded that the “benefits” are a specific amount, so the restitution statute is referencing a “specific debt” and not an amount the court can determine using its discretion.

The defendant argued the court not having discretion violated due process.  The Court noted, however, the court is required to hold a hearing where the defendant can challenge a restitution order.  The defendant argued that these hearings are meaningless if the defendant cannot challenge the restitution amount.

The Court pointed a defendant can challenge causation, whether the victim qualified for benefits, or whether the restitution amount ordered was the amount paid by L&I.  Furthermore, the defendant may petition L&I for a reduction.  L&I may waive or modify the amount owed in the “interest of justice, the well-being of the victim, and the rehabilitation of the individual.” RCW 7.68.120(5).

The Court concluded the statute was not ambiguous and therefore did not apply the rule of lenity.

The Court concluded RCW 9.94A.753(7) requires a court to order restitution for the amount of benefits paid by L&I pursuant to the CVCA, without discretion to modify the amount.  The Court affirmed the appeals court and upheld the restitution order.

If you have been charged with a crime, an experienced Washington criminal defense attorney can help you protect your rights, including identifying any potential challenges to restitution or other LFOs.  Set up a consultation with Blair & Kim, PLLC by calling (206) 622-6562.

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