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Following a Washington automobile accident, a seriously injured person may have to deal with various insurance companies. Although dealing with an insurance company can be difficult, insurers are prohibited from acting in bad faith or engaging in unfair practices.  If the insurer does act improperly, the claimant may be able to pursue an insurance bad faith claim.  In a bad faith case, the insurer’s files may be important evidence.

In a recent case, the plaintiff sought documents and information created during litigation of the bad faith case. The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident with a drunk driver.  After settling for policy limits with the at-fault driver’s insurance, she filed an underinsured motorist claim.  According to the appeals court’s opinion, the underinsured motorist policy limit was $50,000.  The insurer offered $2,500.  The plaintiff demanded $100,000.  She ultimately filed suit against the insurance company for unfair claims settlement practices and bad faith.  She alleged her damages “far exceeded” the policy limits.

In response to discovery requests, the plaintiff denied the damages payable by the insurer exceeded $75,000, which is the threshold amount in controversy for a case to be removed to federal court on diversity jurisdiction. She responded to a question regarding whether she sought trebling or any multiplier of damages affirmatively. She also stated she intended to seek punitive damages if there was a determination the insurer violated the Insurance Fair Conduct Act.  She acknowledged the amount in controversy could exceed the $75,000 threshold, but offered to stipulate that the amount in controversy did not exceed that $75,000.  The parties never reached agreement on the language for the stipulation.  The insurer informed the plaintiff it would seek removal if the plaintiff did not sign the stipulation.

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Generally, warrantless seizures are unconstitutional unless an exception applies.  One such exception is a Terry stop.  A defendant recently challenged evidence found in a search after what the state agreed was a Terry stop in a Washington criminal case.

A sheriff deputy was dispatched after a 911 call reporting an unwanted person in the caller’s home.  The caller told the dispatcher the woman’s first name and said he had previously allowed her to stay there, but she was not welcome any more.  He reported she had left, but then said she came back.  He also said she had previously climbed in through a window to get inside.  He did not indicate she was violent.

The deputy saw a woman matching the description the caller gave walking about two-tenths of a mile from the caller’s home.  He stopped, and when he asked, the woman indicated her first name was the name given by the caller.  The deputy asked her for identification, but she indicated she did not have any.  She provided her name and birth date.  The woman stayed in front of his car and its headlights while the deputy searched her name in his computer.  The deputy confirmed she had an outstanding warrant.  He arrested her and found a white powdery substance in a baggie in her pocket.  The substance was found to be methamphetamine.

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In a Washington divorce case, a disability allowance is treated differently depending on whether it replaces future lost wages or a standard retirement pension.  This distinction will determine if the allowance is considered separate or community property. In a recent case, an ex-wife challenged the characterization of her ex-husband’s disability allowance.

The ex-husband began working for a fire department in 1963.  The couple married in 1991.  The ex-husband was injured on the job and determined to be physically unable to perform his job duties.  He began receiving a monthly allowance of about 60% of his salary.

The ex-husband brought most of the assets to the marriage, but the couple signed a community property agreement that purported to transfer all separate property to community property.

In a Washington felony violation of a no-contact order case, the prosecution must prove the existence of the no-contact order and the defendant’s knowledge of it.  For a variety of reasons, the defense may not want the jury to see the no-contact order.  A recent issue in Washington has been whether a defendant can keep a no-contact order out of evidence by stipulating to its existence and his or her knowledge of it.  The Washington Supreme Court recently addressed this issue.

A court entered a domestic violence no-contact order prohibiting the defendant from contacting his girlfriend after he was convicted of a domestic violence offense.  Finding the defendant was a “credible threat to [her] physical safety,” the court ordered the defendant not to come within 1000 feet of her residence.

Nevertheless, the couple lived together.  According to the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion, a neighbor witnessed them having a verbal altercation outside their home.  The girlfriend told the neighbor the defendant had hit her and asked them to call 911.  The girlfriend told law enforcement the defendant struck her head and face repeatedly and law enforcement observed bruising and other injuries.

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In a Washington automobile accident, an injured person may have some coverage through his or her own insurance policy.  This first party coverage may include personal injury protection (PIP), which includes medical expenses and lost wages.  When filing a claim against your own insurer, the terms of the policy, including the definitions, are critical in determining whether coverage applies.

In a recent case, an injured man challenged his insurer’s denial of his PIP claim. According to the court’s opinion, a driver parked on the street opened his door and struck the plaintiff, who was riding his bicycle.  The plaintiff was covered by a California insurance policy with up to $5,000 in medical expenses for an “insured” under the PIP benefit.  The relevant language in the definition of “insured” was “a pedestrian when struck by” a motor vehicle.  The policy did not define “pedestrian.”

The insurer denied the plaintiff’s claim on the grounds he was not a pedestrian because he was riding his bicycle when the accident occurred.  The plaintiff sued the insurer.  The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the insurer, finding the term “pedestrian,” under its ordinary and common meaning, does not include a person riding a bicycle.  The plaintiff appealed.

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In some ways, Washington juvenile offenders may be treated differently than they would be if they were adult offenders.  Both the Washington Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court have acknowledged that “children are different.”

In a recent case, a juvenile defendant challenged her sentence.  She was a first-time offender.  She did not meet the conditions of her deferred disposition, so it was revoked.  The juvenile court found the standard sentencing range would be insufficient and entered a manifest injustice disposition and imposed 24 to 32 weeks total incarceration.

The defendant appealed and the appeals court granted expedited status.  However, according to the appeals court’s opinion, its review was “compromised by the transgressions of the prosecutor.” The appeals court noted the prosecutor had not timely obtained findings of fact and conclusions of law. When the prosecutor did obtain the findings and conclusions after being ordered to do so by the clerk of court, they did so in an ex parte proceeding without giving notice to the defendant or her attorney.  The defendant raised the issue and included it in her brief.  The prosecutor did not directly address the issue in its brief, but instead referenced a different pleading.

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In certain circumstances, Washington courts ordering domestic violence protection orders must also order the restrained person to surrender his or her firearms, other dangerous weapons, and concealed pistol licenses (CPL).  RCW 9.41.800. There is a standard order that courts may use.  The standard order requires the restrained person to immediately surrender the weapons and CPL, get a receipt for the items surrendered, complete a proof of surrender form, and file all of the documents within five days.

In one case, a wife questioned whether the husband had truly surrendered all of his firearms after being ordered to do so.  After separating from her husband and moving to Washington, the wife sought a domestic violence protection order, alleging, in part, he had threatened to shoot her.  The commissioner issued the order, but found a lack of personal jurisdiction over the husband prevented her from ordering a weapons surrender.

The wife moved for revision of the order.  At the hearing, the husband said no firearms were in his possession because his relatives had them.  He requested a continuance.  The court granted the continuance, but entered a temporary order requiring him to turn over his weapons and any CPL.  The husband subsequently filed a proof of surrender form with a receipt from the sheriff’s office showing he had surrendered three guns.

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In a Washington child support case, the court may order the payment of post-secondary educational support for a dependent child. The support is conditioned on the child enrolling in an accredited academic or vocational school, pursuing education in line with his or her vocational goals, and remaining in good academic standing.  If these conditions are not met, the support is suspended.  Additionally, the child must make his or her academic records available to both parents.

A mother recently challenged an order for past due post-secondary support, arguing her daughter had not complied with the statutory requirements.  The court had entered a child support order regarding post-secondary support of the parties’ daughter that required the mother to pay 66.3 percent of the child’s post-secondary education support.  To receive the support, the daughter had to meet the requirements of RCW 26.19.090(4), which requires the child to make all grades and academic records available to both parents as a condition of receiving the support.

The father moved for contempt for past due post-secondary support in 2017.  He submitted proof of expenses and enrollment records.  The mother said she called to pay tuition, but the Registrar’s Office informed her they could not give her access to any information due to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). They told her students were told they must grant access for anyone else to have access to their account.

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Even when the parties to a Washington divorce agree that one spouse should pay spousal maintenance to the other, they may not agree to the amount or duration of that maintenance.  In making determinations regarding maintenance, courts should consider certain factors and make specific findings.  A husband successfully challenged the amount and duration of maintenance he was ordered to pay his former wife because the court had filed to fully address the required factors and make findings regarding the parties’ income.

The couple married in 1987.  The wife stayed home and cared for the children.  The husband retired from the Marine Corps at the age of 43 in 2006 and began working as a truck driver.  The couple separated in 2012 and the husband filed for divorce in 2015.  He agreed he would pay maintenance to the wife.

On a monthly basis, the husband received wages, significant overtime earnings, military disability, and military retirement. In addition to his military retirement, the husband had a retirement account with his current employer and a 401k.  He claimed $3,995 in monthly expenses.  The wife declared she had no income and $3,566 in expenses each month.

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To convict a defendant of vehicular homicide in a Washington criminal case, the state must prove that the defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of the victim’s death.  In Washington law, the term “proximate cause” includes both actual cause and legal cause.  In a recent case, a defendant challenged his vehicular homicide conviction, alleging that there was an intervening superseding cause of the victim’s death.

According to the court’s opinion, the defendant was intoxicated when he rear-ended a vehicle at 85 m.p.h.  The defendant did not stop to assist the other driver, whose vehicle was disabled across the left and middle lanes.

A witness to the collision stopped to help.  The Good Samaritan pulled onto the right shoulder and engaged his flashers.  He crossed the freeway to help the driver and was on the phone with the 911 dispatchers when another vehicle struck the disabled vehicle.  The impact caused the disabled vehicle to strike the Good Samaritan, causing injuries that resulted in his death 12 days later.

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