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Individuals facing Washington criminal charges have a due process right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.”  A person’s due process rights may be violated if the court acts as an advocate instead of a neutral arbiter.  A juvenile recently challenged his conviction after the trial judge questioned the prosecution’s witnesses.

The 15-year-old juvenile was charged with escape in the second degree.  The state alleged he had “knowingly escape[d]” from home custody.

Witnesses

A community placement specialist testified about ankle monitor technology and electronic home monitoring (“EHM”).   He was asked on cross examination if he remembered going over the contract with the juvenile or if his answers were based off the reports.  He testified that he “felt” like he had, but could not say so for certain.

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The U.S. Supreme Court has denied the government’s emergency applications for partial stays of the preliminary injunctions against the new Title IX Final Rule while the appeals are pending in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits.  The preliminary injunctions are not nationwide, but apply only to the plaintiffs.

The government argued the challenged provisions of the rule should be severed so that the rest of the Final Rule could take effect. Those provisions are 34 C.F.R. §106.10, which defines sex discrimination, §106.31(a)(2), which addresses sex-separated spaces and prohibits schools from adopting policies that prevent a person from participating in an education program or activity consistent with their gender identity, and the definition of hostile environment harassment in §106.2.  The Court noted the lower courts had determined that the new definition of sex discrimination, including discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity, affected many of the other provisions and could not readily be severed, at least at the preliminary stage.  The lower courts also noted that schools would have difficulty applying the Final Rule when parts of it were enjoined.

The government had the burden of showing that its severability argument was likely to succeed and that the equities favored a stay.  The Court concluded the government had not met that burden with the limited record and emergency applications.  The Court determined the government had not given it a sufficient basis to overturn the lower courts’ conclusions that the challenged provisions were intertwined with the other provisions or identified any specific provisions that were sufficiently independent.  In addressing the equities, the Court noted the Sixth Circuit had already expeditated the case and anticipated the Courts of Appeal “will render their decisions with appropriate dispatch.”

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Washington spousal maintenance is intended to equalize the parties’ standard of living for an appropriate period.  Pursuant to RCW 26.09.090, a court may order spousal maintenance in an amount and for the period it deems just after it has considered all relevant factors, including: the financial resources of the requesting spouse and their ability to meet their needs independently; the time they need to acquire sufficient education or training to obtain appropriate employment; the standard of living established while the parties were married; the marriage’s duration; the age, condition, and financial obligation of the spouse seeking maintenance; and the ability of the other spouse to meet their own needs and financial obligations while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.  A court abuses its discretion if it awards maintenance that is not based on a fair consideration of these factors.

Divorce Case

A former husband recently challenged a spousal maintenance award in the Supreme Court of Washington.  The parties had been married for more than 20 years when they separated in 2015.  The husband had a bachelor’s degree. The wife had graduated high school and attended a year of college, but had not earned a degree. They bought a home during the marriage and it was paid off before the divorce was finalized.  According to the Washington Supreme Court, they had “a secure, middle-class lifestyle” during the marriage.

After the wife lost her job during her second pregnancy in 1997, the parties agreed she would not go back to work and would be a stay-at-home parent.  She went back to work part-time in 2004 and worked only part time until 2007.  Her highest net annual income during that period was $10,485 in 2007.  She worked as a receptionist at a dental office from 2009 until she was terminated in 2017, earning an average of $30,000 for much of that time.  In October 2020, she was working in a call center. According to her October 2021 financial declaration, she made $2840 each month with expenses totaling $2,719.

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The U.S. and Washington Constitutions generally protect individuals from unlawful searches.  Although individuals on parole or probation have somewhat diminished privacy rights, there are still limitations on when they can be searched.  A defendant recently appealed his conviction, arguing the search of his vehicle was improper.

According to the appeals court’s published opinion, the defendant was pulled over for suspicion of driving on a suspended license in October 2020.  When the officer found out the defendant was on probation, he contacted the Department of Corrections and requested a community custody officer (“CCO”).  The defendant’s probation arose from a previous firearm conviction.

Upon reviewing the conditions of the defendant’s community custody, the CCO found that the defendant was in violation of a geographic boundary condition which prevented him from being in the Central District of Seattle, where he was pulled over.  The CCO testified that the geographic restriction had been requested because the defendant was listed in a police data base as a member of a gang associated with that area.

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The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) has requested a partial stay of the preliminary injunctions against the new Title IX Final Rule in two lawsuits involving a total of ten states. The requests to the U.S. Supreme Court involve the injunction applicable to the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia in the lawsuit filed in the Eastern District of Kentucky and the injunction applicable to the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho in the lawsuit filed in the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The DOJ asked the Court to issue stays to the extent the injunctions prohibit implementation of the portions of the Final Rule that were not challenged in the underlying lawsuits, arguing the plaintiffs had not challenged the “vast majority” of the changes made by the Final Rule.

The DOJ argued the district courts erred in enjoining the portions of the Final Rule that the plaintiffs had not challenged because of the principle that equitable relief is to be tailored to the alleged injuries and claims.

It also argued the courts erred by “enjoining Section 106.10’s clarification that Title IX prohibits discrimination based on gender identity.” It further argued that the plaintiff’s alleged injuries could have been redressed with an injunction of “Section 106.31(a)(2) and Section 106.2’s definition of hostile-environment harassment as applied to gender-identity discrimination.” Furthermore, it argued the inclusion of gender-identity discrimination in Section 106.10 was required by the Court’s decision in Bostock v. Clayton County.

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A trial court generally can only modify a Washington parenting plan if it finds, based on new facts since the prior plan, that there has been a substantial change in circumstances of the nonmoving party or the child. The court must also find the modification is in the child’s best interests and necessary to serve the child’s best interests. RCW 26.09.260. RCW 26.09.270 requires a court to deny a modification motion unless adequate cause to hear the motion is established in the affidavits. A mother recently challenged court orders dismissing her modification petition and denying her motion for reconsideration.

Pursuant to the permanent parenting plan, the child lived primarily with the father. The mother could have visitation every other weekend if certain conditions were met. According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, there were limitations on the mother’s visitation due to her “long-term problem with drugs, alcohol or other substances. . .” The parenting plan further provided that visitation would be revoked if she consumed drugs or alcohol.

Modification Petition

The mother petitioned for modification in 2023, alleging the father engaged “in a pattern of emotional and psychological abuse as well as coercive control over [the child].”

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A wife recently appealed a trial court’s decision not to grant a domestic violence protection order (“DVPO”) in a divorce proceeding.  She argued that RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) required the court to issue the DVPO after a finding of domestic violence and that the court incorrectly interpreted the statute to require it to perform a risk analysis after it found domestic violence had occurred.  She also argued the court erred in denying the DVPO for reasons that were expressly prohibited in the statute.

RCW 7.105.225(1) states “the court shall issue a protection order” if the petitioner proves the statutory requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.  To obtain a DVPO, the petitioner must prove they were “subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.”  The statute further sets forth grounds for which the court may not deny or dismiss the petition for a protection order, including: either party being a minor, unless relief or remedies are specifically limited elsewhere in Chapter 7.105 based on a party’s age; the petitioner’s failure to report the conduct to law enforcement; a no-contact order or restraining order having been issued in a criminal or domestic relations proceeding; the petitioner’s ability to obtain relief in another action or proceeding; pending criminal charges against the respondent; the time since the last incident; or the respondent not living near the petitioner.  RCW 7.105.225(2).

In this case, the court found the wife had been subjected to domestic violence by the husband.  The court concluded the statute suggested the court is then to conduct a risk analysis to determine whether to grant the DVPO. The trial court then concluded that the statute allowed it to deny the DVPO because of the combined reasons of the passage of time since the incident occurred and the husband no longer living near the wife.

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Two federal courts have granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the Department of Education (“Department”) from implementing or enforcing the new Final Rule, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance in certain states.

The States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho filed suit in the Western District of Louisiana, and filed motions for preliminary injunction and motions for stay to prevent the Final Rule from taking effect on August 1, 2024.  The States of California, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia filed an amici curaie brief opposing the motions.  The court found the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits that the Final Rule is contrary to the Administrative Procedures Act, violates the Free Speech Clause and the Free Exercise Cluse of the First Amendment, violates the Spending Clause, and is arbitrary and capricious.  The court also stated it showed “the abuse of power by executive federal agencies in the rulemaking process.” The court granted the motion for preliminary injunctions and enjoined and restrained the Department from implementing or enforcing the Final Rule and enjoined and restrained the Final Rule from going into effect on August 1, 2024, pending additional orders from the court.  This injunction only applies to the States of Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, and Idaho.

The States of Tennessee, Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, Virginia, and West Virginia filed suit in the Eastern District of Kentucky to enjoin and invalidate the Final Rule.  The Christian Educators Association International and a fifteen-year-old female student identified as “A.C.” were allowed to file an Intervenor Complaint.  In its opinion, the Eastern District of Kentucky stated “the Department would turn Title IX on its head by redefining ‘sex’ to include ‘gender identity.’”  The court concluded the Department exceeded its authority to promulgate regulations pursuant to Title IX because its interpretation conflicts with Title IX’s plain language.  The court also stated there were “serious First Amendment implications” with the Final Rule’s definition of sexual harassment, which the court determined could require educators to use student’s preferred pronouns, even if doing so conflicted with the educator’s own religious or moral beliefs.  The court further concluded the Department’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, stating the Department had not provided a reasoned explanation for departing from its previous interpretations or for leaving in place regulations that conflicted with the new requirements regarding gender-identity.

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In some circumstances, a Washington juvenile court may decline or waive jurisdiction and transfer a case, resulting in the juvenile being tried as an adult.  The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the factors to be considered by a juvenile court in making a decision to decline jurisdiction in Kent v. United States.  Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals has further held that when a defendant raises the issue of racial bias in a declination hearing, supported by some evidence, the juvenile court must rule on the issue.  State of Washington v. Quijas.  In a recent case, Division Three also reviewed a case in which the juvenile court had not addressed the issue of racial bias or discrimination.

At the time of the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the fifteen-year-old defendant was pending trial for first degree murder.  The state alleged the defendant shot and killed a nineteen-year-old man.  The state also alleged the murder had been unprovoked and premeditated, and that the juvenile and the victim did not know each other.

The defendant was just fourteen years old at the time of the shooting.  The state moved to have him tried as an adult.  The court admitted 49 exhibits and heard eight witnesses testify, including the defendant’s mother, his school principal, a gang expert, juvenile detention staff, and a forensic psychologist.

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Arbitration and alternative dispute resolution can save parties to a Washington divorce some of the expense and stress of litigation.  The ability to challenge a decision resulting from a voluntary arbitration may be limited, however.  In a recent case, a father sought court review of an arbitration decision relating to certain parenting plan disputes.

The parties got married in 2014 and had two children together before separating in early 2022.  They filed a joint separation petition, but the mother subsequently withdrew.  The father amended the petition to seek dissolution.

The parties later signed a CR 2A Stipulation and Agreement that stated they agreed the agreement was “fair, just and equitable” and were signing “freely, knowingly and voluntarily. . .” The agreement indicated it was the parties’ “full and final settlement on the issues in this divorce, including most of the provisions for the final parenting plan, the provisions for the child support order, and property division.  It also stated the parties would negotiate the open items of the parenting plan, and if they could not reach an agreement, they would mediate the remaining items with the first available of three listed mediators.  If they failed to reach a mediated settlement, they agreed to binding arbitration.

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