Seattle Attorneys Blog
A Washington criminal defendant may file a Knapstad motion to dismiss criminal charges due to insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of the crime. Along with the motion, the defendant must submit a supporting affidavit or declaration that alleges there are no material facts in dispute and stating the agreed facts or a stipulation of facts. The defendant may also attach witness statements, police reports, or other documentation. The prosecutor may also submit affidavits or declarations and attach documentation to be considered by the court. If there are no material facts in dispute and the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case of the crime. The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cr. R. 8.
In a recent unpublished case, the state appealed a dismissal of charges pursuant to the defendant’s Knapstad motion.
The appeals court noted that, in deciding a Knapstad motion, the trial court considers the sufficiency of the evidence based on the facts stated in the defendant’s affidavit. Alleged facts that the prosecution does not specifically deny are deemed admitted. The appeals court recited the facts as taken from the evidence produced by the parties.
According to the appeals court’s opinion, the defendant drove himself and two minor co-defendants to a Wal-Mart. Security footage showed the two minors going into the store, with each of them having at least one hand in his pocket. Law enforcement subsequently identified the defendant and the two minors as members of a particular gang.
There was another group of young males inside the store and at least two of them were members of a different gang. The groups met in a corner of the store. One or both of the juvenile co-defendants fired shots. At least three members of the other group, a bystander, and a security guard were injured, but they all survived.
Shell casings were found in the aisle where the defendant was. The prosecution did not allege the defendant had a weapon or that he fired any shots. The defendant and one of the minors were observed running in the aisle from which shots were fired. The defendant and the other minor “push[ed] into each other and then beg[a]n running in separate directions.
The defendant went back to his vehicle and drove around. He stopped in parking spots, but ultimately left the parking lot.
The defendant and two co-defendants were each charged with five counts of assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon.
The defendant filed a Knapstad motion. The prosecution argued that he was an accomplice in the five counts.
At the hearing, the trial court asked if there was any evidence the defendant and the co-defendants planned the shooting. The prosecutor said they did not think there would be evidence the defendants entered the store with the intent to shoot anyone. The court asked if there was evidence the defendant knew the others had guns. The prosecutor stated law enforcement would testify the three defendants were in the same gang and that the two minors appeared to be carrying guns.
The state argued there were disputed material facts.
The trial court, however, found the state had not established direct evidence the defendant had knowledge of the crime to support liability as an accomplice. The court noted there would not be direct testimony that he knew his co-defendants had guns or that they had gone to the store to confront the other group or to commit any crime. The court expressed concerns the prosecution may be trying to argue the defendant knew the co-defendants were armed because they were in the same gang and “that’s what gang members do. . .” The court pointed out that would be “guilt by association.”
The court requested additional briefing and oral argument. Specifically, the court wanted additional argument on whether the defendant could be liable as an accomplice based on evidence that he had waited at the scene for the co-defendants.
At the second hearing, the trial court concluded there was only speculation that the defendants went to the store with intent to commit a crime or that the defendant had knowledge one or both of the co-defendants had intent to commit a crime. Additionally, there was only speculation that the co-defendants had intent to commit a crime before they encountered the other group inside the store. There was no evidence supporting any of this speculation. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and dismissed the charges against him.
The state appealed, arguing there were disputed material facts and the trial court had improperly weighed evidence.
To prevent charges being dismissed in a Knapstad motion, the prosecution must present some evidence supporting each element of the crime. If the prosecution disputes or denies material allegations of fact in the defendant’s motion, then the motion must be denied. State v. Knapstad.
The defendant was charged based on his role as an alleged accomplice to the two co-defendants. To convict a defendant as an accomplice, the prosecution must prove that he shared the criminal intent and was ready to assist them in the crime.
The prosecution argued the defendant was ready to assist the co-defendants in the crime because he was in an active position to assist and aid them by standing with them when at least four of the victims were shot.
The appeals court rejected this argument, however, noting there was no evidence the defendant shared criminal intent with the co-defendants. Although he was present in the store, he was not armed and there was no evidence he was “ready to assist” the co-defendants in the shooting. His presence alone was not sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Additionally, there was no evidence of communication or planning related to the crime. The prosecution conceded there was no evidence the defendants went to the store with intent to shoot someone.
The prosecution also argued the defendant initially fled with one of the co-defendants and appeared to be waiting and looking for them while he drove around the parking lot and stopped in different parking spots before ultimately leaving.
The defendant argued that by the time he was in the parking lot, the crimes were already complete. The appeals court pointed out that knowingly aiding someone after they commit a crime is rendering criminal assistance and cannot constitute aiding them in the commission of the crime as an accomplice.
The appeals court concluded the trial court had not improperly weighed the evidence as the state argued, but instead “separated the evidence and inferences from speculation…” The trial court correctly concluded the state had failed to establish a prima facie case of the charged crimes and affirmed the dismissal.
This case shows that people may sometimes be charged just because they are present at the time of a crime. If you believe you may be facing criminal charges, a skilled Washington criminal defense attorney can fight to protect your rights. Set up a consultation with Blair & Kim, PLLC, at (206) 622-6562.