Articles Posted in Juvenile Cases

Pursuant to State v. Houston-Sconiers, a trial court must consider the mitigating qualities of a juvenile offender’s youth in sentencing a juvenile in a Washington criminal case.  The court has discretion to impose a sentence below the standard range in juvenile cases.  In a recent case, a juvenile defendant challenged his sentence, which was based on a joint recommendation as a result of a plea deal.

According to the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion, the defendant fatally stabbed someone multiple times and stole his wallet.  The defendant ultimately admitted to stabbing the victim.  The defendant was charged with first degree murder with a deadly weapon and would have been subject to a standard range sentence between 240 to 320 months, plus a deadly weapon enhancement.

Following lengthy negotiation, the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree robbery and second degree murder while armed with a deadly weapon.  The standard range sentence was 41 to 54 months for the first degree robbery charge and 142 to 244 months for the second degree murder charge.  The state and the defendant jointly recommended a sentence that would total 244 months of confinement.

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A juvenile recently challenged guilty adjudications arising from her actions while being detained and forcibly changed into scrubs at the hospital.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, a deputy went to the high school because the juvenile refused to leave the school.  The juvenile made statements about suicide and self-harm.  She was transported to the hospital’s emergency department.  When she refused to change clothes, she was restrained and forcibly changed into scrubs.  Two nurses told the deputy the juvenile assaulted them.

The juvenile was charged with interference with a health care facility and two counts of assault in the third degree.

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Individuals facing Washington criminal charges have a due process right to a “fair trial in a fair tribunal.”  A person’s due process rights may be violated if the court acts as an advocate instead of a neutral arbiter.  A juvenile recently challenged his conviction after the trial judge questioned the prosecution’s witnesses.

The 15-year-old juvenile was charged with escape in the second degree.  The state alleged he had “knowingly escape[d]” from home custody.

Witnesses

A community placement specialist testified about ankle monitor technology and electronic home monitoring (“EHM”).   He was asked on cross examination if he remembered going over the contract with the juvenile or if his answers were based off the reports.  He testified that he “felt” like he had, but could not say so for certain.

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In some circumstances, a Washington juvenile court may decline or waive jurisdiction and transfer a case, resulting in the juvenile being tried as an adult.  The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the factors to be considered by a juvenile court in making a decision to decline jurisdiction in Kent v. United States.  Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals has further held that when a defendant raises the issue of racial bias in a declination hearing, supported by some evidence, the juvenile court must rule on the issue.  State of Washington v. Quijas.  In a recent case, Division Three also reviewed a case in which the juvenile court had not addressed the issue of racial bias or discrimination.

At the time of the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the fifteen-year-old defendant was pending trial for first degree murder.  The state alleged the defendant shot and killed a nineteen-year-old man.  The state also alleged the murder had been unprovoked and premeditated, and that the juvenile and the victim did not know each other.

The defendant was just fourteen years old at the time of the shooting.  The state moved to have him tried as an adult.  The court admitted 49 exhibits and heard eight witnesses testify, including the defendant’s mother, his school principal, a gang expert, juvenile detention staff, and a forensic psychologist.

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Fines, fees, and penalties can add up and result in a significant financial impact on criminal defendants and their families.  These legal financial obligations can be particularly burdensome when imposed on juvenile offenders, who in some cases may be too young to work and who often come from low-income families.  If they cannot pay, the outstanding debt may affect the juvenile’s ability to obtain credit, housing, or even a job.

Effective July 1, 2023, the legislature amended the penalty assessment statute, RCW 7.68.035, to remove penalty assessments for juveniles and prohibit penalty assessments under that statute for adult defendants found to be indigent.  The legislature also enacted a new statute, RCW 13.40.058, which provides that a court cannot impose or collect any fine, administrative fee, cost, or surcharge from a juvenile or their parent or guardian in connection with a Washington juvenile offender proceeding. This prohibition specifically includes, but is not limited to DNA collection fees, diversion fees, and victims’ penalty assessments. The result of these two laws is that a court can no longer impose any legal financial obligations on a juvenile, except restitution.

Prior to the amendment, RCW 7.68.035 required the court to impose a $100 penalty assessment for each case or cause of action for a “most serious offense” or a sex offense under RCW chapter 9A.44 for which a juvenile was adjudicated. “Most serous offenses” include class A felonies, second degree assault, first and second degree manslaughter, a felony with a deadly weapon verdict, and other specified offenses.  The amendment also removed the requirement for the court to order up to seven hours of community restitution when a juvenile was adjudicated of an offense with a victim that did not constitute a most serious offense or sex offense, unless the court found the order would not be practicable for the juvenile.

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Young siblings sometimes scuffle, but they usually are not charged with a Washington crime as a result.  A teenager recently challenged a guilty adjudication for fourth degree assault arising from an altercation with his younger sister.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, which relied primarily on the juvenile court’s unchallenged findings, the sixteen-year-old juvenile had recently had surgery and was weak and had lost weight.  His eleven-year-old sister came upstairs to the bedroom where he was resting looking for the dogs to take them out before school. When she tried to get the juvenile’s dog, it nipped her and she struck it on the nose.  The juvenile told her not to hit the dog.

She called the juvenile a name as she tried to get the other dog from under the bed.  She said the juvenile gave her a “quick tap in the face with his foot.” She responded by throwing a bottle of lotion and a bottle of vitamins at him, hitting him with one of them.

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A Washington criminal defendant can raise a self-defense claim by offering some evidence that their actions occurred in circumstances of self-defense.  Once the defendant meets this low burden, the burden shifts to the state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the absence of self-defense.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the juvenile’s mother came into the 15-year-old juvenile’s room and saw her hide a cell phone under the covers. The juvenile refused to give it to her mother, and they scuffled over it.  The juvenile ultimately kicked her mother twice.

The state charged the juvenile with fourth degree assault with notice of a domestic violence allegation.  The juvenile testified , saying, “. . . the only reason I kicked her was to . . . get her off of me,” and “. . . I kicked her because she was on my leg, and it hurt.  And—because I knew at that point I knew I wasn’t going to get the phone back . . . .”

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Washington self-defense is an affirmative defense. A person may lawfully use force when they are about to be injured to prevent or try to prevent an offense against their person, when the force used is not more than necessary.  RCW 9A.16.020(3).  Force is necessary when there does not appear to be a reasonably effective alternative and the force used is reasonable to the lawful purpose.  RCW 9A.16.010(1).  A juvenile recently appealed his adjudication of guilt of second degree assault, claiming the state failed to disprove he acted in self-defense.

The appeals court’s unpublished opinion stated the juvenile got into a verbal altercation at school with another juvenile, identified by the appeals court’s opinion, as “J.S.” The juvenile called the other student a homophobic slur.  J.S. filed an incident report at the office.

They had a second altercation in the courtyard later that day.  The juvenile again called the other student a homophobic slur.  The other student advanced toward the juvenile.  The juvenile tried to walk away.  The juvenile started recording on his phone. The juvenile extended his arm as the other student approached, and the other student slapped him.  They both went to the ground. The other student was on top and started hitting the juvenile. The other student did not have or threaten to use a weapon, but the juvenile pulled a knife from his pocket and stabbed the other student six times in eight seconds.  The juvenile had not responded by pushing or hitting back, but just stabbed the other student.  The two did not really know each other and had not spoken before the altercations.

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A Washington juvenile record may be sealed if certain circumstances are met.  The court schedules an administrative sealing hearing at the disposition hearing, if the juvenile is eligible.  The hearing is to occur after the last of the following: the juvenile’s 18^th birthday, the anticipated end of the juvenile’s probation, and the juvenile’s anticipated release from confinement or completion of parole.  Certain offenses, including “most serious offenses,” certain drug offenses, and certain sex offenses, are not eligible for a sealing hearing.  The court is to seal the record if it finds at the time of the hearing that the juvenile is no longer on supervision for the case and has fully paid restitution to the person named in the order, excluding any restitution owed to an entity providing insurance or health care coverage.  If the court finds the juvenile is still on supervision, then it is to continue the hearing within 30 days after the anticipated completion of the supervision. If the court finds the juvenile is not still on supervision for the case but has failed to fully pay restitution to the person named in the order, the court is to deny sealing the record and issue an order that specifies the restitution that is unpaid to the person and directs the juvenile on how to pursue sealing the record.  RCW 13.50.260.  The state recently appealed the sealing of a juvenile record, arguing the juvenile had failed to fully pay restitution.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the juvenile pleaded guilty to second degree malicious mischief and agreed to pay restitution.  The court ordered him to pay $1,233.17 in restitution and set a date for a hearing to seal the record.

The state argued at that hearing that the juvenile failed to fully pay restitution so the record could not be sealed pursuant to RCW 13.50.260(1)(d).  The juvenile court still sealed the record, finding the juvenile was eligible for the record to be sealed because he had “paid in full the amount of restitution owing,” but also that “the remaining amount of restitution . . . is $613.17.”

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Washington second degree criminal trespass is a misdemeanor. To convict a person of second degree criminal trespass, the state must show that they knowingly entered or remained unlawfully on someone else’s property.  A juvenile recently challenged a guilty adjudication for second degree criminal trespass, arguing there was insufficient evidence that he had knowingly entered and unlawfully remained on Port property.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the police received a complaint from a Port employee that the thirteen-year-old juvenile was skateboarding on Port property.  The property was posted with several signs prohibiting skateboarding.  The employee stated Port employees has contacted the juvenile and asked him to stop, but he had responded with profanity.

The officer issued the juvenile a no trespassing notice and told him he was trespassed from Port property for life.  The juvenile, the officer, and the employee all signed the notice.

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