Criminal Law

Washington Appeals Court Addresses Mixed-Motive Traffic Stop

April 11, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

A defendant recently challenged his convictions for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, use of drug paraphernalia, and unlawful possession of a firearm in the second degree (“UPF”). The convictions arose from a traffic stop, which the defendant argued was pretextual. He also challenged his UPF conviction on constitutional grounds.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, a police officer on patrol saw a parked vehicle pull out without signaling. The bumper obscured the front plate and the rear plate light was not working. He stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as the defendant.

The officer saw drug paraphernalia in an open bag on the seat. The defendant consented to a search of the vehicle, but revoked that consent. The officer obtained a warrant and seized evidence from the vehicle, including a handgun, controlled substances, and drug paraphernalia.

Washington Appeals Court Reverses Second Degree Assault Conviction Based on Merger Doctrine

March 30, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Generally, the state can bring multiple charges arising from the same conduct in one proceeding, but double jeopardy protections under both the U.S. and Washington Constitutions protect a Washington criminal defendant from multiple punishments for the same offense. If a defendant is charged under different statutes for the same act, the court must determine if those crimes are the same offense. A Washington defendant recently challenged his robbery and assault convictions, arguing they violated his double jeopardy protections.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the defendant took trading cards and a package of tuna from a Walmart store on Black Friday in 2021. Loss prevention officers (“LPOs”) thought he was behaving suspiciously when they saw him selecting the cards.

Two LPOs followed him while another observed through the surveillance feed. The LPOs saw him go past the registers without making a purchase. They stopped him in the vestibule. The defendant turned over a box of trading cards and the tuna and moved past one of the LPOs. The two LPOs testified that he had shoved one of them, but the defendant denied it.

Washington Appeals Court Determines Juvenile’s Case Was Improperly Dismissed with Prejudice

March 13, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Pursuant to CrR 8.3(a), a Washington trial court may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint upon motion of the prosecutor. Pursuant to CrR 8.3(b), the court may dismiss a prosecution because of governmental misconduct or arbitrary action if the defendant’s rights have been prejudiced, materially affecting his right to a fair trial. Pursuant to CrR 8.3(c), the court must dismiss without prejudice if the court grants a defendant’s motion for pretrial dismissal because of insufficient evidence. A Washington appeals court recently considered whether a trial court could dismiss a criminal case with prejudice when the state had moved for dismissal without prejudice pursuant to CrR 8.3(a).

According to the opinion, a juvenile defendant, identified by the appeals court as “WH” was charged with third degree malicious mischief, first degree animal cruelty, and second degree assault by strangulation, and harassment – threats to kill, arising from an incident involving his girlfriend, identified as “KM.” He made a preliminary appearance in juvenile court. The state added charges for attempted second degree murder and, alternatively, second degree attempted felony murder and transferred the case to adult court.

The state subsequently asked to return the case to juvenile court with the attempted murder charges dismissed. The juvenile was arraigned again under the original case number and pleaded not guilty in juvenile court.

Washington Sentencing Court Must Order Restitution in Amount of CVCA Benefits Paid

February 25, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

The Department of Labor and Industries (“L&I”) administers the Crime Victims Compensation Program. Generally, the court must order restitution in Washington criminal cases where the victim is entitled to benefits pursuant to the crime victims’ compensation act (“CVCA”) as set forth in chapter 7.68 RCW. If the court has not ordered restitution in a case where a victim is entitled to such benefits, L&I may petition for restitution within a year from judgment being entered. The court must then hold a restitution hearing and enter a restitution order. RCW 9.94A.75(7). In a recent case, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington considered whether the court had discretion to order restitution to L&I in an amount less than the CVCA benefits paid.

According to the opinion, the defendant pleaded guilty to crimes related to a home invasion that resulted in the death of one of the residents of the home. The state sought $10,480 in restitution to L&I for benefits paid related to the victim’s medical and funeral expenses.

The defendant asked for a reduction in the amount of restitution based on mitigating factors. The trial court denied his request, believing its discretion was limited, and ordered restitution in the amount sought by the state. The appeals court affirmed the restitution order.

Washington Community Custody Condition Limiting Geographic Movement Was Unconstitutionally Vague

February 9, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Sentences for certain Washington criminal offenses may include community custody. The specific conditions of a defendant’s community custody depend on the offense for which the defendant was convicted. In some circumstances, certain community custody conditions are mandatory, some may be waived by the court, and others are discretionary. In a recent case, a defendant successfully challenged a community custody condition as unconstitutionally vague.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the facts were undisputed. The defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree with a deadly weapon following an incident in which he attacked someone with a broom. The defendant was sentenced within the standard range and the court also imposed certain community custody conditions. One condition required the defendant to stay in the geographic boundaries either identified by the corrections officer in writing or stated in the Stay Out of Drug Area order.

The defendant appealed this condition, arguing it was unconstitutionally vague.

Washington Supreme Court Addresses Sentencing of Juvenile Offenders With Plea Agreements

January 30, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Pursuant to State v. Houston-Sconiers, a trial court must consider the mitigating qualities of a juvenile offender’s youth in sentencing a juvenile in a Washington criminal case. The court has discretion to impose a sentence below the standard range in juvenile cases. In a recent case, a juvenile defendant challenged his sentence, which was based on a joint recommendation as a result of a plea deal.

According to the Washington Supreme Court’s opinion, the defendant fatally stabbed someone multiple times and stole his wallet. The defendant ultimately admitted to stabbing the victim. The defendant was charged with first degree murder with a deadly weapon and would have been subject to a standard range sentence between 240 to 320 months, plus a deadly weapon enhancement.

Following lengthy negotiation, the defendant pleaded guilty to first degree robbery and second degree murder while armed with a deadly weapon. The standard range sentence was 41 to 54 months for the first degree robbery charge and 142 to 244 months for the second degree murder charge. The state and the defendant jointly recommended a sentence that would total 244 months of confinement.

Washington Appeals Court Considers Application of Multiple Transaction Aggravator in Drug Case Sentencing

January 20, 2025 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

A court may only impose a sentence above the standard range in a Washington criminal case if it finds substantial and compelling reasons that justify it. This finding must be based on specific aggravating circumstances that have been determined beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury. In drug trafficking cases, a “major violation” of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (“VUCSA”) can support a sentence greater than the standard range. One factor that may identify a major violation of VUCSA is if the current offense involves multiple transactions. RCW 9.94A.535. A defendant recently challenged her exceptional sentence, based on the multiple transactions aggravator.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, the defendant sold methamphetamine and pills that appeared to be Oxycodone but were actually fentanyl three separate times over a three month period.

The state charged her with a separate charge for each type of drug she sold at each sale and three charges for each sale of counterfeit Oxycodone. The state included a sentence enhancement, arguing each offense was a major violation pursuant to RCW 9.94A.535(3)(e)(i), the multiple transgressions aggravator.

Washington Appeals Court Concludes Physical Control Statute Is Not Unconstitutionally Vague

December 26, 2024 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Generally, a Washington criminal law must be sufficiently specific to notify an ordinary person of what conduct it prohibits and provide ascertainable standards of guilt to prevent arbitrary enforcement. In a recent case, a defendant challenged the statute prohibiting being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence after she was found sleeping in the passenger seat of her parked vehicle.

The defendant was charged with being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence. According to the appeals court’s opinion, an officer found her sleeping in the passenger seat of her vehicle while parked with the engine running. She moved to dismiss, arguing the law was unconstitutionally vague.

The city argued the statute was constitutional and that “actual physical control” can include someone in the passenger seat of a non-moving vehicle.

Washington Appeals Court Overturns Felony Violation of A Court Order Conviction

December 7, 2024 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

Pursuant to RCW 7.105.450(1)(a), a violation of a Washington domestic violence protection order is generally a gross misdemeanor. A violation can be a felony, however, if it constitutes an assault “that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree.” RCW 7.105.450(4). In a recent unpublished case, a Washington appeals court considered whether a defendant can be convicted of both a felony violation of a no contact order under RCW 7.105.450(4) and assault in the second degree under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a) for the same acts.

An April 2022 no contact order prohibited the defendant from having contact with the protected person, identified by the appeals court as “C.S.,” or coming within 1,000 feet of her or her residence for 10 years.

According to the court’s opinion, C.S. called 911 in September 2022. She said the defendant had been staying with her and had kicked and “beat [her] up.” She said she had refused to give him a cigarette and he tried to steal her purse. She said there was a struggle when she grabbed it back and he punched her and knocked out her tooth. She said he kicked her and dragged her over rocks.

Washington Appeals Court Addresses Accomplice Liability vs. Rendering Criminal Assistance

November 28, 2024 | by Blair & Kim, PLLC

A Washington appeals court recently addressed the difference between rendering criminal assistance and accomplice liability in a case in which a defendant appealed her convictions for being an accomplice to second degree burglary and third degree theft.

The state alleged the defendant acted as an accomplice to a woman in a burglary and theft of a family heirloom from a barn. According to the appeals court’s opinion, security footage showed “extracts of actions” taken by the woman at the remote property. The video was divided into parts lasting between five and twenty-three seconds, with gaps in the woman’s conduct between the parts.

The Trial

The state did not present any evidence regarding how close their relationship was and the record did not show the defendant knew about any criminal history or propensity of the woman to steal.