Articles Posted in Civil Protection Order

Pursuant to RCW 7.105.450(1)(a), a violation of a Washington domestic violence protection order is generally a gross misdemeanor. A violation can be a felony, however, if it constitutes an assault “that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree.” RCW 7.105.450(4). In a recent unpublished case, a Washington appeals court considered whether a defendant can be convicted of both a felony violation of a no contact order under RCW 7.105.450(4) and assault in the second degree under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a) for the same acts.

An April 2022 no contact order prohibited the defendant from having contact with the protected person, identified by the appeals court as “C.S.,” or coming within 1,000 feet of her or her residence for 10 years.

According to the court’s opinion, C.S. called 911 in September 2022.  She said the defendant had been staying with her and had kicked and “beat [her] up.” She said she had refused to give him a cigarette and he tried to steal her purse.  She said there was a struggle when she grabbed it back and he punched her and knocked out her tooth.  She said he kicked her and dragged her over rocks.

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In a petition for a Washington domestic violence protection order (“DVPO”), the court shall issue the protection order if it finds “the petitioner has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225. Domestic violence includes unlawful harassment. Unlawful harassment is “[a] knowing and willful course of conduct . . . that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” The course of conduct must cause actual substantial emotional distress and must be conduct that would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person.  RCW 7.105.010.  The definition statute identifies the factors to be considered in determining if a course of conduct has a legitimate or lawful purpose, including: who initiated contact, whether there has been clear notice contact is unwanted; whether the “course of conduct appears designed to alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner”; whether the respondent is acting under statutory authority; whether the course of conduct’s purpose or effect is to unreasonably interfere with the privacy of the petitioner or “creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive living environment”; and whether a previous court order has limited the respondent’s contact with the petitioner or their family. RCW 7.105.010(6).

In a recent unpublished opinion, an ex-wife challenged a DVPO protecting her former husband.  The former wife had remarried, and according to the former husband, the parties began having difficulty co-parenting in 2021.

The ex-husband sought a DVPO in May 2023.  He attached texts and emails, alleging the former wife had been abusively targeting him electronically. His fiancée stated in her declaration that the ex-wife had chased them through a parking lot when they were leaving an event for the child. The ex-husband asked that the ex-wife be required to surrender her firearms.

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A court may order a Washington ex parte temporary protection order without notice to the respondent pursuant to RCW 7.105.305.  These temporary protection orders are intended to protect the petitioner’s safety until a full hearing. Courts have acknowledged the risk to a petitioner’s safety if notice is required for the initial temporary order and have held that any temporary infringement on the respondent’s rights by lack of notice is justified by protecting the petitioner from the immediate threat. The court may not, however, issue a full protection order without the respondent having notice and an opportunity to be heard.  RCW 7.105.310.  A mother recently appealed a court’s denial of her motion for revision of denial of her request for a temporary Domestic Violence Protection Order (“DVPO”) on the ground she had not given notice to the respondent.

The parties shared residential custody of their five-year-old child.  The mother petitioned for a DVPO for herself and the child while the parenting plan appeal was pending.  She sought an immediate temporary DVPO until a full hearing could be held.  She alleged the child came back from the father’s custody on July 8, 2023 in “urine soaked clothing” and said the father had touched his “private area.” At the hospital, the child told a staff member he “feels unsafe” at his father’s home and that his father “hits him” and “touch[es] his privates.” The mother also alleged the child had frequent bedwetting, feared using the bathroom alone, developed tics, and exhibited dissociation.

The superior court commissioner denied the temporary DVPO and did not set a full hearing, marking the box that stated the petition did not list a specific incident and approximate date of the behavior supporting the protection order. The order also indicated the petitioner had 14 days to amend the petition before it was dismissed.  The commissioner marked the box stating service on the father was “not required” because “[t]he petition was denied.”

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A wife recently appealed a trial court’s decision not to grant a domestic violence protection order (“DVPO”) in a divorce proceeding.  She argued that RCW 7.105.225(1)(a) required the court to issue the DVPO after a finding of domestic violence and that the court incorrectly interpreted the statute to require it to perform a risk analysis after it found domestic violence had occurred.  She also argued the court erred in denying the DVPO for reasons that were expressly prohibited in the statute.

RCW 7.105.225(1) states “the court shall issue a protection order” if the petitioner proves the statutory requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.  To obtain a DVPO, the petitioner must prove they were “subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.”  The statute further sets forth grounds for which the court may not deny or dismiss the petition for a protection order, including: either party being a minor, unless relief or remedies are specifically limited elsewhere in Chapter 7.105 based on a party’s age; the petitioner’s failure to report the conduct to law enforcement; a no-contact order or restraining order having been issued in a criminal or domestic relations proceeding; the petitioner’s ability to obtain relief in another action or proceeding; pending criminal charges against the respondent; the time since the last incident; or the respondent not living near the petitioner.  RCW 7.105.225(2).

In this case, the court found the wife had been subjected to domestic violence by the husband.  The court concluded the statute suggested the court is then to conduct a risk analysis to determine whether to grant the DVPO. The trial court then concluded that the statute allowed it to deny the DVPO because of the combined reasons of the passage of time since the incident occurred and the husband no longer living near the wife.

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Allegations of domestic violence can affect a Washington custody case.  A Washington appeals court recently considered whether a child could pursue a Domestic Violence Protection Order (“DVPO”) against his mother after another court denied his father’s petition to modify custody based on the same domestic violence allegations.

Walla Walla County Proceedings

When the parents divorced in 2016 or 2017, the parenting plan named the mother as primary parent and gave the father visitation.

According to the unpublished opinion of the appeals court, the father petitioned for an immediate restraining order protecting him and the child from the mother in Walla Walla County in June 2022.  At the same time, he petitioned for modification of the parenting plan, alleging the mother had been verbally and physically abusive toward the child and that the child refused to go back to her home.  He attached a large number of text messages between the mother and the child. The trial ultimately found there was “no substantial change of circumstances” and denied the father’s modification petition and awarded the mother attorney’s fees.

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Washington felony violation of a court order occurs when a person, who has at least two previous convictions for violating a court order, knows a no-contact order exists and knowing violates a provision of it.  Willful violation of a court order occurs when a person has willful contact with another that is prohibited by a valid court order and the person has knowledge of the order.  Accidental contact is not willful.  A person must both know of the no-contact order and intend the contact. Washington case law has held that proof that the defendant acted knowingly constitutes proof they acted willfully. Previous Washington cases have held that the defendant does not have to have specific knowledge of the terms of a no-contact order, but instead must have knowledge of the no-contact order and know that the willful contact violated it.

A defendant recently appealed his conviction, arguing the prosecution had misstated the law regarding the meaning of “knowingly.”  He was charged with two counts of violation of a court order – domestic violence.  According to the appeals court’s published opinion, the protected party under the no-contact order testified that she heard knocking on her bedroom window and saw the defendant outside. She called the police.  She also testified that she received two text messages that she translated and summarized as saying “he hates me for everything I’ve done to him, for not letting him see the kids.” She further stated that he hoped the kids started hating her for not letting them see their father.

The state’s closing arguments included multiple statements about the knowledge requirement of violation of a no-contact order. The state stated “This element does not say [the defendant] knew of the provisions of this order and knowingly violated this order. The knowing part refers solely to the violation.” The state further stated, “What I have to prove to you is that [the defendant] knowingly violated a provision of this order.”

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During the COVID-19 pandemic, courts adopted a number of policies and procedures to prevent infection.  A defendant recently appealed his convictions for violation of a no contact order, challenging whether the state proved he had knowledge of the order when he had not signed it during COVID-19 protocols.

According to the appeals court’s opinion, a 2020 domestic violence no-contact order prohibited the defendant from contacting the ex-girlfriend until 2025. In October 2021, the two got into an argument.  The ex-girlfriend called 911 and reported that the defendant had strangled her.

The responding officer observed that the ex-girlfriend was “very nervous” and appeared fearful and like she had been crying.  He testified she told him the defendant strangled her. He did not see any injuries.

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“Coercive control” was added to Washington’s definition of “domestic violence” in 2022.  Although the statute provides a number of examples of coercive control, there have been few appellate cases interpreting it.  In an unpublished opinion, a Washington appeals court recently reviewed a domestic violence protection order, granted partly upon a finding that the husband had engaged in acts of coercive control.

In her petition for a domestic violence protection order, the wife indicated the husband had or owned firearms and that his use of firearms or other dangerous weapons “would be a serious and immediate threat. . .”  The petition also stated he “threatened to ‘kill himself’ while holding a gun.” She also stated he would say he was a burden and should end his life about once a month.   The petition stated the husband had “23 failed suicide attempts from his childhood.” The wife alleged he had more than 15 firearms in the house, with at least three in the bedroom and that ammunition was nearby.  She stated she wanted a divorce but did not feel it would be safe to tell the husband while he had guns.

The husband denied the allegations.  He averred he had never threatened the wife.  He also averred he had never attempted to kill himself, pointed a firearm at his head and threatened to kill himself, or said he “should end [his] life.”

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Generally, Washington’s “corpus delicti” rule requires the state to prove that the crime occurred, independent of the defendant’s own statements.  The state must provide sufficient evidence in its case-in-chief.  However, if the defendant presents evidence during their case-in-chief, they waive the challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as of that point and an appeals court may consider all of the evidence to determine if there was sufficient evidence to support an inference that the crime happened.

A defendant recently challenged his conviction for felony violation of a protection order, arguing the state had presented insufficient evidence of the knowledge element of the corpus delicti because it relied on statements he had made to the responding officer.

The defendant’s grandaunt obtained a temporary protection order prohibiting the defendant from coming within 1,000 feet of her home on January 18, 2022. According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the next day she heard someone try to unlock her door and saw the defendant through the peephole.  She told him he was not supposed to be there and he had to leave.  He first sat down and smoked a cigarette before leaving.

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In some circumstances, a Washington criminal defendant may be eligible for a sentencing alternative, including a parenting sentence alternative, a drug offender sentencing alternative (“DOSA”), or a mental health sentencing alternative (“MHSA”).  The defendant must meet certain conditions to qualify for these alternatives.  A defendant is only eligible for an MHSA if: their conviction is for a felony but is not a sex offense or a serious violent offense, they have a diagnosis for a serious mental illness recognized by the current mental health diagnostic manual, the judge determines the defendant and community would benefit from treatment and supervision, and the defendant is willing to participate.  RCW 9.94A.695(1). If the court determines that an MHSA is appropriate, it imposes a term of community custody within a range determined based on the length of the standard range sentence, but the court has discretion in determining the actual length of the community custody within the ranges.  RCW 9.94A.695(4).

A defendant recently challenged his sentence for felony violation of a no-contact order, arguing the court did not follow the proper procedure set forth in the statute when it denied his request for an MHSA.

According to the unpublished opinion of the appeals court, the defendant was arrested outside his ex-wife’s apartment in April, 2021.  Two active no-contact orders prohibited him from contacting her or being within 1,000 feet of her apartment.  He had served a sentence for a prior violation and recently been released.  He was also under the conditions of a DOSA.

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