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Alleged victims of sexual misconduct are often allowed to proceed in their Title IX lawsuits under a pseudonym, but courts have recently been split on whether to allow accused students filing Title IX lawsuits based on the school’s investigatory or disciplinary processes to do the same.  A federal court in Colorado recently decided to allow a male student accused of sexual misconduct to proceed with his lawsuit against the university and related defendants under the pseudonym “John Doe.”

The plaintiff was a student at a Colorado university who filed suit against the university and related defendants following an accusation that he had sexual contact with a child during behavioral therapy school. He alleged the investigation did not provide him with due process and was biased against him based on his sex. He alleged violations of due process rights and Title IX and other causes of action.

He filed a Motion for Leave to Restrict Access Pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.2, seeking to proceed anonymously “due to the highly personal, sexually explicit, and confidential nature of the allegations” and concerns for reprisal that could affect his education and result in academic, financial, or mental harm.

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Generally, a Washington criminal law must be sufficiently specific to notify an ordinary person of what conduct it prohibits and provide ascertainable standards of guilt to prevent arbitrary enforcement.  In a recent case, a defendant challenged the statute prohibiting being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence after she was found sleeping in the passenger seat of her parked vehicle.

The defendant was charged with being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under the influence. According to the appeals court’s opinion, an officer found her sleeping in the passenger seat of her vehicle while parked with the engine running.  She moved to dismiss, arguing the law was unconstitutionally vague.

The city argued the statute was constitutional and that “actual physical control” can include someone in the passenger seat of a non-moving vehicle.

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Characterization of property as separate or community in a Washington divorce case is determined at the date the property was acquired.  An increase in separate property’s value is presumed to also be separate property.  Separate property remains separate unless there is clear and convincing evidence showing it was converted to community property.  Generally, a written acknowledgement is required to rebut the separate property presumption for real property.  In a recent unpublished case, a Washington appeals court considered whether a trial court erred in characterizing equity in separate real property as community property.

A month before the marriage, the wife purchased a home for $207,000 with a $40,000 down payment.  The parties got married in September 2016 and their son was born the same day. The wife generally stayed home caring for the child.

The husband petitioned for divorce in June 2022.  The parties separated at the end of June.  They agreed the marital home, which was the one purchased by the wife before the marriage, was worth $402,000.  They also agreed it was the wife’s separate property, but the husband claimed he had an “equitable interest” in the property and asked the equity, less the wife’s down payment, be divided equally.

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Pursuant to RCW 7.105.450(1)(a), a violation of a Washington domestic violence protection order is generally a gross misdemeanor. A violation can be a felony, however, if it constitutes an assault “that does not amount to assault in the first or second degree.” RCW 7.105.450(4). In a recent unpublished case, a Washington appeals court considered whether a defendant can be convicted of both a felony violation of a no contact order under RCW 7.105.450(4) and assault in the second degree under RCW 9A.36.021(1)(a) for the same acts.

An April 2022 no contact order prohibited the defendant from having contact with the protected person, identified by the appeals court as “C.S.,” or coming within 1,000 feet of her or her residence for 10 years.

According to the court’s opinion, C.S. called 911 in September 2022.  She said the defendant had been staying with her and had kicked and “beat [her] up.” She said she had refused to give him a cigarette and he tried to steal her purse.  She said there was a struggle when she grabbed it back and he punched her and knocked out her tooth.  She said he kicked her and dragged her over rocks.

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In many Washington divorce cases, characterization of property as separate or community can be a contentious issue.  A property’s character is determined when it is acquired.  Property that is established to be separate is presumed to remain separate unless there is sufficient evidence to show the intent to convert it to community property.  Separate property can only be changed to community property if there is clear and convincing evidence of the spouse’s intent to convert it.  Intent to convert property can be shown through a quitclaim deed, but there is not a presumption that a change in title from one spouse to both spouses converts property to community property. If a quitclaim deed has a stated purpose of establishing community property, the court can consider extrinsic evidence in determining intent. A husband recently challenged a court’s characterization of a house he bought before the marriage as community property.

According to the appeals court’s unpublished opinion, the husband had purchased the home while he was single.  He refinanced it during his first marriage and signed a quitclaim deed to himself and his first wife.  He divorced his first wife in 2010 and he agreed during the divorce that the house was community property. He refinanced the house to remove his first wife’s name and pay her share of the community property as part of the divorce settlement.

The Trial

The parties got married in 2011.  Both had been married before and had children and separate assets.  Three of their six bank accounts were joint.  Additionally, they had a joint investment account. The husband testified he used the parties’ paychecks and the wife’s child support payments to pay the family’s debts. He said they combined and commingled their accounts early in the marriage.

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A Washington appeals court recently addressed the difference between rendering criminal assistance and accomplice liability in a case in which a defendant appealed her convictions for being an accomplice to second degree burglary and third degree theft.

The state alleged the defendant acted as an accomplice to a woman in a burglary and theft of a family heirloom from a barn.  According to the appeals court’s opinion, security footage showed “extracts of actions” taken by the woman at the remote property.  The video was divided into parts lasting between five and twenty-three seconds, with gaps in the woman’s conduct between the parts.

The Trial

The state did not present any evidence regarding how close their relationship was and the record did not show the defendant knew about any criminal history or propensity of the woman to steal.

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In a petition for a Washington domestic violence protection order (“DVPO”), the court shall issue the protection order if it finds “the petitioner has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent.” RCW 7.105.225. Domestic violence includes unlawful harassment. Unlawful harassment is “[a] knowing and willful course of conduct . . . that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose.” The course of conduct must cause actual substantial emotional distress and must be conduct that would cause substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person.  RCW 7.105.010.  The definition statute identifies the factors to be considered in determining if a course of conduct has a legitimate or lawful purpose, including: who initiated contact, whether there has been clear notice contact is unwanted; whether the “course of conduct appears designed to alarm, annoy, or harass the petitioner”; whether the respondent is acting under statutory authority; whether the course of conduct’s purpose or effect is to unreasonably interfere with the privacy of the petitioner or “creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive living environment”; and whether a previous court order has limited the respondent’s contact with the petitioner or their family. RCW 7.105.010(6).

In a recent unpublished opinion, an ex-wife challenged a DVPO protecting her former husband.  The former wife had remarried, and according to the former husband, the parties began having difficulty co-parenting in 2021.

The ex-husband sought a DVPO in May 2023.  He attached texts and emails, alleging the former wife had been abusively targeting him electronically. His fiancée stated in her declaration that the ex-wife had chased them through a parking lot when they were leaving an event for the child. The ex-husband asked that the ex-wife be required to surrender her firearms.

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A male student’s Title IX claim against his university arising from a Title IX investigation and disciplinary action against him recently survived a motion to dismiss in a New Jersey federal court.  According to the court’s unpublished opinion, the plaintiff and his former girlfriend were students in the same program at a public university in New Jersey.  In fall 2022, she told several classmates and three faculty members that he had sexually assaulted and harassed her.  The plaintiff alleged that he had told two professors she was spreading false rumors.

Title IX Allegations

In September 2022, a professor filed a complaint, alleging the plaintiff had engaged in “unwanted and inappropriate touching, . . . making unwanted advances towards students, and using abusive language.”

The plaintiff subsequently took a leave of absence and intended to return on October 17.  On October 16, a professor informed some students via email that the plaintiff would be back the next day.  The plaintiff alleged his former girlfriend shared the email with the whole class and he started getting threats from other students.

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A Title IX discrimination case by a student accused of a Title IX violation can be difficult to prove.  A male student recently had his Title IX claims against his Illinois university dismissed. He was accused of sexual assault and the university imposed interim restrictions pending the investigation.  While the proceedings were pending, the university notified him he would be suspended while it investigated another allegation that he had used cocaine in a fraternity house.  The university subsequently found him responsible for sexual assault.

He filed suit in federal court in Illinois alleging sex discrimination and retaliation under Title IX, as well as breach of contract. The university moved to dismiss. The plaintiff argued the investigation and adjudication were biased against him and the university retaliated when he challenged the bias.

Because it was a motion to dismiss, the court accepted the facts alleged by the plaintiff as true and viewed them in a light most favorable to him.

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A Washington criminal defendant may file a Knapstad motion to dismiss criminal charges due to insufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of the crime.  Along with the motion, the defendant must submit a supporting affidavit or declaration that alleges there are no material facts in dispute and stating the agreed facts or a stipulation of facts.  The defendant may also attach witness statements, police reports, or other documentation. The prosecutor may also submit affidavits or declarations and attach documentation to be considered by the court.  If there are no material facts in dispute and the undisputed facts fail to establish a prima facie case of the crime.  The court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Cr. R. 8.

In a recent unpublished case, the state appealed a dismissal of charges pursuant to the defendant’s Knapstad motion.

The appeals court noted that, in deciding a Knapstad motion, the trial court considers the sufficiency of the evidence based on the facts stated in the defendant’s affidavit. Alleged facts that the prosecution does not specifically deny are deemed admitted.  The appeals court recited the facts as taken from the evidence produced by the parties.

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